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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Robert and Maura Collinsgru ("the Collinsgrus"), acting 
on behalf of their son, Francis Collinsgru ("Francis"), appeal 
from the district court's dismissal of their son's complaint 
against the Palmyra Board of Education ("Palmyra"). The 
Collinsgrus sought to represent Francis in a civil suit 
following a state administrative decision to deny their son 
special education services under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. S 1400 et seq. (1994 & 
Supp. 1997) (the "IDEA").1 The district court found that it 
was bound by our decision in Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College 
of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991), in which we held 
that a non-attorney parent could not represent his children 
in a tort action in federal court. After holding that the 
Collinsgrus could not represent Francis themselves, the 
court gave the parents thirty days in which to hire an 
attorney for him. When they failed to do so, the district 
court dismissed Francis's claims without prejudice for 
failure to prosecute. On appeal, the Collinsgrus contend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Cites to the IDEA will be to the 1997 version of the Act unless 
otherwise specified. 
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that Osei-Afriyie does not control because: (1) the IDEA 
creates the same rights in parents that it creates in 
children; (2) the claims in their son's complaint are 
functionally their own; and (3) they should therefore be 
allowed to proceed pro se on those claims. 
 
We first must consider whether we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal, in light of the fact that the district court's order 
was neither a final resolution on the merits nor an 
interlocutory order of the type clearly appealable under 28 
U.S.C. S 1292. We conclude that we have jurisdiction under 
the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. On the 
merits, we conclude that the IDEA does not confer joint 
substantive rights on parents and their children. We agree 
that the IDEA grants parents ample procedural rights to 
ensure active parental involvement at all stages of the 
development and implementation of a child's individual 
educational program, even through the administrative 
process. We think, however, that Congress's decision to 
endow parents with these procedural rights should not be 
read, under the language of the IDEA, to imply that parents 
also possess the same underlying substantive rights that 
their children possess. Therefore, we do not think that the 
Collinsgrus may properly be said to be suing under their 
own cause of action. We conclude, in light of the IDEA's 
language and the statutory and common law rules guarding 
against non-attorney representation of another, that 
parents seeking to enforce their child's substantive right to 
an appropriate education under the IDEA may not 
represent their child in federal court. 
 
I. Background 
 
At all relevant times, the Collinsgrus resided in Palmyra, 
New Jersey, and Francis attended the Palmyra Public 
Schools. The Collinsgrus maintain that Francis is learning 
disabled, and needs to receive an education that will 
accommodate his learning disabilities, but the School 
Board's Child Study Team decided that he was ineligible to 
receive special education services. Accordingly, the 
Collinsgrus sought special education services through the 
administrative procedures established by the IDEA. Under 
the express provisions of the IDEA, the Collinsgrus were 
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able to participate in the administrative proceedings 
without legal representation, though they engaged the 
assistance of a non-lawyer expert. See 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(h)(1). Following a nineteen-day hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that Francis's 
educational difficulties were not severe enough to warrant 
special services. 
 
The Collinsgrus, proceeding pro se, filed a civil suit 
contesting this determination in the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(2)(A). In their 
initial complaint, the Collinsgrus alleged that Palmyra had 
inadequately tested Francis for a disability and that the 
School Board had interfered with an independent 
evaluation of his needs. In addition, they contended that 
the decision by the ALJ was contrary to the law and to the 
record in the case, and that the ALJ had "manufactured" 
testimony. Finally, they asserted that the decision was 
tainted by the public policy position of the State 
Commissioner of Education that too many students in New 
Jersey were being labeled as learning disabled. The Board 
answered the complaint, but also objected by letter to the 
fact that, rather than hiring a lawyer to represent Francis, 
the Collinsgrus were attempting to represent him 
themselves. In response, the Collinsgrus amended the 
caption of their complaint to emphasize that they were 
asserting their own rights as parents under the IDEA, as 
well as their son's rights, to ensure that their son received 
the free, appropriate education guaranteed by the Act. 
 
The Collinsgrus acknowledge that they would prefer to be 
represented by experienced counsel rather than continue to 
pursue their appeal in the federal district court pro se. 
Although the Collinsgrus are represented by attorneys from 
the Public Citizen Litigation Group in their appeal before 
this Court, these attorneys have entered their appearance 
solely for the purpose of litigating the regionally and 
nationally important question of the Collinsgrus' right to 
proceed pro se before the district court. The Collinsgrus 
concede that they do not qualify for appointment of counsel 
under the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1915 
(1994). However, because of the magnitude of this litigation, 
the Collinsgrus explain that they cannot afford to retain an 
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attorney on a normal fee basis to handle their civil case, 
nor have they been able to locate an attorney willing to take 
their case on a contingent fee or pro bono arrangement. 
 
The district court held that the Collinsgrus were not 
entitled to represent Francis pro se in the civil action, 
reasoning that this result was compelled by our decision in 
Osei-Afriyie. The district court also rejected the Collinsgrus' 
effort to characterize their IDEA appeal as an assertion of 
their own claims. Rather, the court ruled, Francis was the 
real party in interest and must be represented by an 
attorney. The court gave the Collinsgrus thirty days to 
retain counsel, prescribing that, if counsel were not 
retained, Francis's claims would be dismissed pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 
 
When the Collinsgrus failed to retain counsel, the district 
court dismissed Francis's claims, staying the parents' 
claims pending resolution of the present appeal. Although 
the Collinsgrus sought certification of an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (1994), the district court 
refused to certify the issue. The court did, however, advise 
the Collinsgrus that they could invoke the collateral order 
exception identified in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), in order to seek immediate 
interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994). The 
Collinsgrus then filed a motion in the district court 
requesting that it clarify which claims they could maintain 
as parents and which only their son could maintain. The 
district court declined to provide this clarification, 
concluding that such a ruling would constitute an advisory 
opinion. This appeal followed. 
 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The district court 
dismissed only Francis's claims for failure to prosecute; the 
Collinsgrus appeal from this dismissal, as well as from the 
related determination that the Collinsgrus could not 
represent Francis themselves. However, the Collinsgrus also 
made certain claims on their own behalf under the IDEA; 
the district court stayed these claims until the issue of 
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Francis's representation is resolved. As a result, the 
challenged order did not finally resolve the merits of this 
case, which would have authorized ordinary review under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291, nor was the order of an injunctive 
nature, such that it would have been immediately 
appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a). Both the 
Collinsgrus and the School Board submit that the question 
whether parents may represent their children in federal 
civil actions following administrative findings under the 
IDEA falls within the collateral order exception to the 
requirement of finality imposed by S 1291. Despite the 
agreement of both parties, we have an independent 
obligation to examine our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 
(1990). 
 
This Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals 
under S 1291 only if the challenged order falls within the 
collateral order exception to the finality requirement of 
S 1291. An appeal from a non-final order will lie if: 
 
       (1) the order from which the appellant appeals 
       conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the 
       order resolves an important issue that is completely 
       separate from the merits of the dispute; and (3) the 
       order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from afinal 
       judgment. 
 
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997). This 
test derives from the Supreme Court's opinion in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 
The first prong is easily met here. It is beyond dispute 
that the district court's order of October 29, 1996, denying 
the Collinsgrus leave to represent their son in a civil suit 
following the administrative denial of special education 
rights under the IDEA, leaves no room for further 
consideration of this issue by the district court. The court's 
order gave the Collinsgrus thirty days to obtain outside 
counsel or face dismissal of those claims brought solely on 
behalf of Francis, for failure to prosecute. The Collinsgrus 
have no further opportunities before the district court to 
reopen the question of their ability to represent Francis. 
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The second prong is also satisfied. First, the question 
whether the Collinsgrus may represent their son in federal 
district court is entirely separate from the merits of the 
underlying action. The Collinsgrus argue that they are 
entitled to represent their son's interests in federal court 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. S 1654 and the IDEA. Review 
of this question will not require us to consider the 
underlying subject matter of this action -- that is, whether 
Palmyra improperly denied Francis appropriate special 
educational services and interfered with the parent's 
procedural rights. See Devine v. Indian River County Sch. 
Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 580 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
immediate review of parental representation would not 
involve the court in the subject matter of the case), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1040 (1998). 
 
Under the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, 
we must also examine the importance of the issue to be 
reviewed. In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 959. "[F]or the 
purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the 
interests that would potentially go unprotected without 
immediate appellate review of that issue are significant 
relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by 
adherence to the final judgment rule." Id. Accordingly, we 
must balance the importance of the Collinsgrus' right to 
represent their son in these proceedings with our interests 
in finality and in avoiding piecemeal appeals. See id. at 
959-60 (citing Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 
503 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Unless appellants are 
able to obtain review of the question whether they may 
represent their son, it appears that they will be unable to 
proceed in the district court on a number of claims. 
Moreover, the question of the parents' right to represent 
their child under the IDEA, already litigated to the court of 
appeals level in other circuits, see infra, is very important 
to the administration of the IDEA. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the question presently before us is of sufficient 
consequence to outweigh our usual interest in finality. 
 
The final prong of the Cohen analysis is less easily met. 
This prong requires that the order appealed from be 
effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The Supreme 
Court has imposed significant restrictions upon 
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interlocutory appeals of orders regarding legal 
representation. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 
U.S. 424 (1985) (denying interlocutory appeal from order 
disqualifying opposing counsel in civil case); Flanagan v. 
United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (denying interlocutory 
appeal from an order granting motion to disqualify counsel 
in a criminal case); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 
449 U.S. 368 (1981) (denying interlocutory appeal from an 
order denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a 
civil case). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
facing the same question that we face here, found a 
relevant difference between questions of representation by 
counsel, which were raised in these Supreme Court cases, 
and questions of pro se representation. We agree that the 
principles of those cases do not prevent us from exercising 
jurisdiction over the question presented in this case. 
 
The Devine court concluded that the question whether a 
party may appear pro se in proceedings before a district 
court cannot be effectively reviewed on appeal."[T]he right 
to represent one's self is effectively lost if not immediately 
vindicated," because the harm in erroneously denying a 
party leave to proceed pro se is that it injures his dignity 
and autonomy, something that cannot later be repaired. 
121 F.3d at 580. Although the dignity/autonomy rationale 
loses lustre in light of our ultimate holding -- that much of 
what the Collinsgrus allege is their own case is actually 
their son's -- we believe that a concern with the rationale 
is at least colorable in this situation. We also think that 
questions of appealability should be decided ex ante and 
not ex post. 
 
Finally, we think that the denial of the right to proceed 
pro se is analogous to an order denying a litigant leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis, which is immediately 
appealable. Roberts v. United States Dist. Court for the N. 
Dist. of Cal., 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950). Like denial of leave 
to proceed in forma pauperis, denial of leave to proceed pro 
se in a civil action may operate to bar many litigants from 
prosecuting or defending their claims. Because these orders 
effectively close the courthouse door to litigants, the 
majority of courts to consider the issue have held that 
orders denying leave to proceed pro se are immediately 
 
                                8 
  
appealable. See, e.g., C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United 
States, 818 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1987); O'Reilly v. New York 
Times, 692 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1982). But see Flora Constr. 
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 
1962) (denying interlocutory appeal of court's refusal to 
permit company to appear pro se by its non-attorney 
president). 
 
We conclude that, because of the impact of the order on 
the litigant's case, the district court's order denying the 
Collinsgrus leave to represent Francis is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, and hence 
we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
 
We review for abuse of discretion a district court's 
dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 341 
(3d Cir. 1982). However, to the extent that the district 
court's dismissal of Francis's claims was based upon its 
construction of the IDEA, we will exercise plenary review. 
See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied sub nom Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Dodson, 517 
U.S. 1163 (1996). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. The Right to Proceed Pro Se 
 
It has long been recognized that a litigant in federal court 
has the right to proceed as his or her own counsel. 28 
U.S.C. S 1654 (1994) ("In all courts of the United States the 
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally 
or by counsel . . . ."). In contrast, under Rule 17 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, minors are precluded from 
determining their own legal actions. Rather, under Rule 
17(c), a representative or guardian "may sue or defend on 
behalf of the infant." It is, however, well-established in this 
Circuit that the right to proceed pro se in federal court does 
not give non-lawyer parents the right to represent their 
children in proceedings before a federal court. See Osei- 
Afriyie v. Medical College of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 
1991). Other circuits follow this rule as well. See Devine, 
121 F.3d at 581-82; Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 
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153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986); Johns v. County of San Diego, 
114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997); Hickey v. Wellesley 
Sch. Comm., 14 F.3d 44, 1993 WL 527964, at *2 (1st Cir. 
Dec. 21, 1993) (unpublished disposition). 
 
Our leading case regarding the ability of parents who are 
not attorneys to represent their children in federal court 
actions is Osei-Afriyie. Francis Osei-Afriyie brought, on 
behalf of himself and his two daughters, a number of tort 
claims relating to the treatment of his daughters for 
malaria. The case came before this court after Osei-Afriyie, 
a non-attorney, had represented himself and his daughters 
in a trial in the district court. A verdict was entered against 
him and his daughters after the jury found that he had not 
brought the case within the applicable statute of 
limitations. The district court had erroneously failed to 
instruct the jury regarding tolling of the statute of 
limitations in cases involving minors. We directly attributed 
this error to Osei-Afriyie's lack of experience and training as 
a lawyer. 937 F.2d at 882. Accordingly, we vacated the 
district court's judgment to the extent that it adjudicated 
the children's claims and remanded these claims. We held 
that the Osei-Afriyies could opt to obtain counsel, request 
appointment of counsel under the in forma pauperis 
statute, or let the children wait until they were old enough 
to pursue their own claims pro se, but the children could 
not be represented by their father. Id. at 883. Accord Johns, 
114 F.3d at 876-77; Cheung, 906 F.2d at 62. 
 
The requirement of representation by counsel is based 
upon two cogent policy considerations. First, there is a 
strong state interest in regulating the practice of law. 
Requiring a minimum level of competence protects not only 
the party that is being represented but also his or her 
adversaries and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, 
or vexatious claims. See Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that 
"the conduct of litigation by a nonlawyer creates unusual 
burdens not only for the party he represents, but also for 
his adversaries and the court"). The second consideration is 
the importance of the rights at issue during litigation and 
the final nature of any adjudication on the merits. Not only 
is a licensed attorney likely to be more skilled in the 
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practice of law, but he or she is also subject to ethical 
responsibilities and obligations that a lay person is not. In 
addition, attorneys may be sued for malpractice. See id. 
 
There are additional reasons why we are reluctant tofind 
that Congress intended parents to be able to represent their 
children in IDEA cases. First, there is a well-established 
presumption that Congress is understood to legislate 
against a background of common-law principles. "[T]he 
courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated 
with an expectation that the [common-law] principle will 
apply except `when a statutory purpose to the contrary is 
evident.' " Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 
U.S. 104, 108 (1991). See also 3 Sutherland Statutory 
Construction S 61.03 (Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) 
("When there is no indication that Congress . . . intended to 
abolish a well-established common-law doctrine through 
the passage of a statute, the act will be interpreted in a way 
that will preserve the common-law doctrine."). In United 
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993), the Court held that 
"[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute 
must `speak directly' to the question addressed by the 
common law." Id. at 534. Indeed, a "party contending that 
legislative action changed settled law has the burden of 
showing that the legislature intended such a change." 
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 
(1989). And in United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 
U.S. 235 (1989), the Court noted that this rule of statutory 
interpretation is particularly apt when the statutory 
provision at issue is ambiguous, when prior law reflected 
significant policy considerations of longevity and 
importance, and when a proposed interpretation is in clear 
conflict with an important federal or state law. Id. at 245. 
 
The rule that a non-lawyer may not represent another 
person in court is a venerable common law rule. See, e.g., 
Herrera-Venegas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (noting that federal courts have consistently 
rejected attempts at third-party lay representation); 
Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(stating that an ordered society has a valid interest in 
limiting legal representation to licensed attorneys); Brown v. 
Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 
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1994) ("Except in the rarest of circumstances, federal 
courts have been uniformly hostile to attempts by non- 
attorneys to represent others in court proceedings."). We 
are reluctant to assume, absent strong evidence to the 
contrary, that Congress intended to override this well- 
settled rule using ambiguous statutory language. In light of 
the rule's significant policy implications, we hold that the 
plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing 
Congress's intent to change the common-law rule against 
non-lawyer representation. 
 
It is true that remedial statutes like the IDEA are to be 
construed liberally. The rule of liberal construction, 
however, appears to be most often applied to the remedies 
created, not the parties permitted to invoke the statute. See 
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248 (1924) (holding that 
a remedial provision should be liberally construed to give a 
remedy in all cases intended to be covered); United States 
v. Stephens, 208 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1953) ("[C]ourts 
cannot, upon the pretence [sic] of construing[a statute], 
enlarge its coverage to bring within it those not expressly or 
by clear intendment embraced within its terms."). 
 
Yet another tool of statutory construction helps us 
understand what Congress intended. The canon of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that explicit 
mention of one thing in a statute implies a congressional 
intent to exclude similar things that were not specifically 
mentioned. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983) (holding that "where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely [sic] in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion"); United States v. Azeem, 
946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining the doctrine). In 
the IDEA, Congress expressly provided that parents were 
entitled to represent their child in administrative 
proceedings. That it did not also carve out an exception to 
permit parents to represent their child in federal 
proceedings suggests that Congress only intended to let 
parents represent their children in administrative 
proceedings. 
 
                                12 
  
B. Plaintiffs' Joint Rights Theory 
 
The Collinsgrus proffer a second argument, in which they 
contend that the analysis of whether parents may proceed 
pro se on behalf of their children is different under the 
IDEA than it is under a tort case like Osei-Afriyie. They 
assert that because an IDEA appeal involves the nature of 
the education to be afforded to their son, it is very much 
their own case. As parents, they are responsible for their 
son's education. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 
(1923) ("[I]t is the natural duty of the parent to give his 
children education suitable to their station in life. . . ."). 
They are entitled to make fundamental decisions regarding 
his education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925) (enjoining enforcement of Compulsory 
Education Act, which prevented parents from choosing to 
send their children to private schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 
400-03 (holding that parents are entitled to control the 
education of their children and that the state may not 
arbitrarily proscribe certain areas of instruction). 
Accordingly, the Collinsgrus assert that they are the real 
parties in interest in this case. 
 
They recognize, of course, that Meyer and Pierce, which 
are grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Federal 
Constitution, are insufficient to confer upon them the right 
to represent their children, and that the IDEA itself must be 
the source of any such right. They contend, however, that 
the Act does contain authority for them to represent not 
only their own rights and interests, but also, albeit 
indirectly, those of their son in proceedings before the 
district court. We therefore turn to the IDEA to determine 
whether Congress intended to create substantive rights in 
the parents of disabled children. 
 
       1. Introduction 
 
The primary purpose of the IDEA is 
 
       to ensure that all children with disabilities have 
       available to them a free appropriate public education 
       that emphasizes special education and related services 
       designed to meet their unique needs; to ensure that the 
       rights of children with disabilities and parents of such 
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       children are protected; . . . and to assess, and ensure 
       the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with 
       disabilities. 
 
20 U.S.C. S 1400(d). For the most part, the IDEA is 
unambiguous as to what rights it provides to parents and 
children. It clearly grants parents specific procedural rights, 
which they may enforce in administrative proceedings, as 
well as in federal court. Additionally, the IDEA permits 
parents to represent their children in administrative due 
process hearings before state or local agencies. 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(h)(2); 34 C.F.R. S 303.422(b)(2) (providing that 
parents have the right to present evidence and examine 
witnesses in administrative due process hearings held 
pursuant to the IDEA). 
 
The statute also creates a right to bring a civil action in 
federal court following a state administrative decision on 
the adequacy of the child's individualized education 
program (the "IEP"). Id. S 1415(i)(2)(A). The Collinsgrus 
concede that the IDEA does not explicitly provide parents 
with the right to continue to represent their children in 
federal district court. Instead, they argue that the language 
of the IDEA, as well as the statute's underlying policy 
concerns, exhibit Congress's intent to create joint rights in 
the child and the parents to have the child educated 
appropriately. As we shall now explain, we do not think 
Congress displayed such an intent, and therefore decline to 
import the concept of joint rights into the IDEA byfinding 
that the Collinsgrus are a real party in interest in Francis's 
case. 
 
In any case turning on statutory interpretation, our goal 
is to ascertain the intent of Congress. Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990). To 
accomplish this goal, we begin by looking at the statute's 
language. If the language is plain, we need look no further. 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989). If the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, 
we may look behind the language to the legislative history 
for guidance. United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In this case, we will require relatively clear evidence of 
Congress's intent to create joint rights in the IDEA. We note 
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here that the Collinsgrus' argument is analogous to asking 
us to find that they possess a private right of action under 
the IDEA. As we have stated in the context of private rights 
of action, "Where a statute does not explicitly create a right 
of action for a particular party, a court may find such a 
right implied only where it can confidently conclude 
Congress so intended." State of New Jersey v. Long Island 
Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 421 (3d Cir. 1994). See also 
Florida Dept. of Bus. Regulation v. Zachy's Wine and Liquor, 
Inc., 125 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1402 (1998). Compare Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (noting that when 
Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it knew how to do so and 
did so expressly). 
 
We also note that the Supreme Court has "long since 
abandoned its hospitable attitude toward implied rights of 
action." Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Because the case at bar is 
comparable to a request for a private right of action, we 
take heed of this guidance; only if we can "confidently 
conclude" from the text and legislative history of the IDEA 
that Congress intended to create joint rights will we find 
such rights in the Act. 
 
       2. Language of the IDEA 
 
Unlike many cases that raise issues of statutory 
construction, we deal here not with a particular statutory 
phrase, but with language scattered throughout the statute. 
The Collinsgrus point to a number of words or phrases 
that, they argue, evidence Congress's intent to treat parents 
as parties in interest. First, they rely on language in S 1415 
that provided attorneys' fees to the "parents or guardian of 
a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party." 
S 1415(e)(4)(B) (1988). However, in 1997 Congress amended 
this section to read, ". . . to the parents of a child with a 
disability who is the prevailing party," which suggests that 
it is the child who should be considered the prevailing 
party. Id. S 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). Second, they point to 
S 1415(e)(4) (1988), which prohibits attorneys' fees for 
services performed after settlement offers. However, 
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S 1415(e)(4)(E) (1988) allows for the award of attorneys' fees 
"to a parent or guardian who is the prevailing party" if he 
was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. 
(This section is now S 1415(i)(3)(E) (1997) and refers to "a 
parent who is the prevailing party.") The plaintiffs contend 
that these subsections make clear that an IDEA suit is the 
parents' own case for 28 U.S.C. S 1654 pro se 
representation purposes. However, it is just as logical to 
read this language simply as a reference to the procedural 
cases in which parents clearly have standing as parties. 
 
Third, the Collinsgrus point to another discussion of 
attorneys' fees that states, "[W]henever the court finds that 
. . . the attorney representing the parent did not provide to 
the school district the appropriate information in the due 
process complaint . . . the court shall reduce . . . the 
amount of attorney's fees." Id. S 1415(i)(3)(F)(iv) (emphasis 
added). However, in the same section, the statute places 
the notice requirement either on "the parent of a child with 
a disability, or the attorney representing the child." Id. 
S 1415(b)(7). While the former language may be read to 
suggest that it is the parent's case, the latter language 
suggests that it is the child's case. 
 
Fourth, the Collinsgrus invoke the IDEA's introductory 
language, which states that one purpose of the IDEA is "to 
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their 
parents or guardians are protected." Id.S 1400(c) (1988) 
(emphasis added) (now S 1400(d)(1)(B), which states that 
one purpose is to "ensure that the rights of children with 
disabilities and parents of such children are protected"). 
However, as noted earlier, it is undisputed that parents do 
possess rights under the IDEA; indeed, they possess 
explicit rights in the form of procedural safeguards. The 
Collinsgrus argue that the IDEA draws no clear distinction 
between procedural and substantive rights, and cite 
Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992), for this 
proposition. In Heldman, the court stated that "the 
procedural rights, in and of themselves, form the substance 
of IDEA." Id. at 155. However, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished quite clearly between substantive and 
procedural rights under the Act. In Board of Education v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the Court stated: 
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       When the elaborate and highly specific procedural 
       safeguards embodied in S 1415 are contrasted with the 
       general and somewhat imprecise substantive 
       admonitions contained in the Act . . . [i]t seems to us 
       no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit 
       as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures 
       giving parents and guardians a large measure of 
       participation at every stage of the administrative 
       process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the 
       resulting IEP against a substantive standard. 
 
Id. at 205-06. 
 
In short, the language of the IDEA is unclear on its face. 
Some of its language can be read to suggest that Congress 
intended parents and children to share the underlying 
substantive right -- that is, that Congress meant both to 
give children a substantive right to an appropriate 
education and to give their parents the substantive right to 
have their children receive an appropriate education. But it 
is equally logical to read the IDEA the other way. Under 
these circumstances, in which the Collinsgrus have not 
made out their case convincingly, we turn to the legislative 
history of the Act for further guidance. 
 
       3. Legislative History of the IDEA 
 
The legislative history offers little additional guidance 
about Congress's purported intent to create joint rights in 
parents and children. On one hand, the Senate Report, in 
discussing a mediation option in the 1985 amendments, 
states, "Although the law has worked very well in most 
cases, Congress knew that there would be instances where 
parents would be denied the free appropriate public 
education to which their handicapped child was legally 
entitled . . . ." 131 Cong. Rec. S1979 (Feb. 6, 1985) 
(statement of Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added). Earlier, in 
considering amendments to the forerunner to the IDEA, the 
Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), the Senate 
Report stated that "parents of [learning disabled] children 
have the right to expect that individually designed 
instruction to meet their children's specific needs is 
available." S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 10 (1975), reprinted in 
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1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1434. See also id. at 32, 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1456 (stating that under the Committee's 
bill, a state's application for federal funds shall provide that 
"special education and related services shall be provided at 
no cost to the parents of a handicapped child"); id. at 42, 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1465 (defining "free appropriate 
public education" as "special education and related services 
. . . to be provided at public expense, without charge to the 
parents or guardians of a handicapped child"). 
 
On the other hand, the legislative history refers to the 
responsibility of the states to "develop procedures for 
appointing the parent or another individual to represent the 
interests of the child," which suggests that the role of the 
parent is to represent solely the interests of the child, not 
to represent jointly held substantive rights. S. Rep. No. 
105-17 (1997), 1997 WL 258948, *49. In addition, the 
Senate Report to the 1985 amendments to the EHA 
indicated that the Act "established an enforceable right to 
free appropriate public education for all handicapped 
children." 131 Cong. Rec. S1979 (1985). The Report also 
noted that the right to judicial review offers protection for 
those rights, thus making the procedural rights of the 
parents appear derivative of the substantive right of the 
child. See id. See also 121 Cong. Rec. S37412 (1975) 
(remarks of Sen. Stafford) (referring to "the rights of the 
child"); S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 7, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1431 
(discussing the protection of "the rights of handicapped 
children"); S. Rep. No. 105-17, 1997 WL 258948, *56 
(stating that S 1415 simplifies the process of delivering 
notices to parents about their child's rights). 
 
We conclude that the legislative history sheds little light 
on Congress's intent to create joint rights. The above-cited 
comments are merely snippets plucked from broad 
discussions of the general statutory goals of the Act and do 
not arise from explicit discussions of the issue at hand. 
Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative 
history clearly implies that Congress intended parents to 
have joint rights with their children under the IDEA, we will 
not read joint rights into the Act. 
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       4. Caselaw 
 
We note here that the two other courts of appeals to 
consider this issue have reached the same conclusion we 
reach today. In Devine, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to 
accept the plaintiffs' argument that the IDEA and its 
regulations authorize parental representation. 121 F.3d at 
581. Instead, the court found no indication that Congress 
intended to allow parents to present evidence and examine 
witnesses on behalf of their children in federal court 
proceedings. The court noted, "In the absence of such 
intent, we are compelled to follow the usual rule-- that 
parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se 
action on their child's behalf -- because it helps to ensure 
that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not 
deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, 
parents." Id. at 582. The Second Circuit recently raised the 
same issue sua sponte and reached a similar conclusion. 
See Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 
124-25 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on the general rule that a 
non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in 
bringing an action on behalf of her child). See also Dacyna 
v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 92-CV-2428, 1992 WL 277993, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1992) (stating, in an IDEA case, that a 
non-lawyer is not entitled to represent his children in place 
of an attorney in federal court); Lawson v. Edwardsburg 
Public School, 751 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (W.D. Mich. 
1990) (holding that father could not represent daughter's 
interests in an EHA case, since he was not an attorney). 
 
While neither the Second nor the Eleventh Circuit 
considered the argument that the IDEA creates joint 
substantive rights in parents and children, we stillfind that 
the reasoning of these courts supports our conclusion. 
 
C. Policy Considerations 
 
Although we believe that the foregoing discussion is 
dispositive, we address a number of policy arguments 
pressed by the Collinsgrus, which, they claim, make their 
reading of the IDEA the most pragmatic reading of the 
statute. First and foremost, they remind us of the hard 
practical reality that parents are often the only available 
advocates for a child's right to an appropriate education. 
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We acknowledge this to be true, for most attorneys will be 
reluctant to take on cases like this, characterized as they 
are by voluminous administrative records, long 
administrative hearings, and specialized legal issues, 
without a significant retainer. While we are sympathetic to 
this argument, it does not carry the day against the 
analysis set forth above. We note too that Congress 
obviously contemplated that some parents of disabled 
children who were successful in their civil appeals would be 
unable to pay their lawyer's fees, as evidenced by the fact 
that Congress included provisions for attorneys' fees in the 
IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B)-(G).2 
 
The Collinsgrus also argue that the general policy behind 
the IDEA favors their argument. In their view, the right of 
parents to control and financially support their child's 
education and the rights of children to receive an education 
are so tightly interwoven that the IDEA must necessarily 
protect both sets of rights and must render parents real 
parties in interest as to every claim brought under the 
IDEA. However, we observe that under the IDEA, a disabled 
child can receive a free appropriate education even if the 
child has no parents; surrogates may act on behalf of a 
child to the same extent that a parent could. See 
S 1415(b)(2). In contrast, parents have no rights under the 
IDEA if they do not have a disabled child seeking an 
education under that statute. To us, this is further evidence 
that the rights at issue here are divisible, and not 
concurrent. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Collinsgrus also note that a number of courts, without 
questioning the practice, have allowed parents to represent their children 
pro se in federal court. See, e.g., Muth v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 
F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dellmuth v. 
Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 
F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Susan R.M. v. Northeast Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1987); Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 
811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987); Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 
328 (6th Cir. 1986); Schreiber v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 952 F. Supp. 
205 (D.N.J. 1997). However, in none of these cases did the court 
consider whether the IDEA permits parental representation. Therefore, 
while we acknowledge that this practice reflects the fact that it is 
difficult 
for parents to find lawyers to take these cases, we reject the suggestion 
that these cases should guide our decision. 
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We conclude that the IDEA's language and legislative 
history, as well as relevant case law and policy 
considerations, suggest that Congress did not clearly intend 
to create joint rights in parents under the IDEA. Therefore, 
we will affirm the district court's dismissal without 
prejudice of Francis's claims on the ground that his parents 
may not represent him in federal court. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
Although I concur with the majority's conclusion that the 
District Court's decision here is immediately appealable, I 
respectfully dissent from their conclusion in Part III that 
the Collinsgrus do not have joint rights with their son 
under the IDEA which they may pursue pro se in the 
federal courts. I believe that these rights arise from the 
special nature of the relationship between parents and their 
children and from the role of parents in directing their 
children's education rights and opportunities. They are the 
rights of both the parents and the children, and they are 
overlapping and inseparable. In enforcing their own rights 
under the Act, parents are also acting on behalf of their 
child. This is so because parents are responsible for their 
children's education. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
400 (1923) ("[I]t is the natural duty of the parent to give his 
children education suitable to their station in life. . .."). 
Parents are entitled to make fundamental decisions 
regarding that education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (enjoining enforcement of 
Compulsory Education Act preventing parents from 
choosing to send their children to private schools); Meyer, 
262 U.S. at 400-03 (holding that parents are entitled to 
control the education of their children and that the state 
may not arbitrarily proscribe certain areas of instruction). 
For this reason, I find the Collinsgrus to be real parties in 
interest in this case, who are entitled to pursue that 
indivisible concern which is both their own and their child's 
educational goals. 
 
Moreover, this result would be consistent with the 
primary purpose of the IDEA -- to assure an appropriate 
public education to children with disabilities. The focus of 
the IDEA rests upon ensuring appropriate educational 
opportunities for children with disabilities. But to 
accomplish this, the Act recognizes the integral role of 
parents in effectuating its educational goals. This 
recognition is evinced in the language and structure of the 
Act and in the procedural safeguards that are included to 
ensure active parental involvement at all stages of the 
development and implementation of a child's individual 
education program. 
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A key factor in the successful implementation of the goals 
of the IDEA are the procedural safeguards that states and 
localities are required to accord to "children with disabilities 
and their parents or guardians" in order to assure "the 
provision of a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(a). The Act requires educational agencies to provide 
"an opportunity for parents or guardian of a handicapped 
child to examine all relevant records with respect to the 
identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the 
child, and the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child, and to obtain an independent 
evaluation of the child." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(b)(1)(A). The 
educational agency must also provide "written prior notice 
to the parents or guardian of the child whenever such 
agency or unit -- (i) proposes to initiate or change, or (ii) 
refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation 
or educational placement of the child or the provision of a 
free appropriate public education to the child." 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(b)(1)(C). In addition the educational agency must 
provide parents with "an opportunity to present complaints 
with respect to any matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such 
child." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(b)(1)(E). 
 
These protections demonstrate that Congress envisioned 
that parents would play an active and informed role in the 
evaluation and education of their children. The Senate 
Committee report recommending passage of the IDEA's 
precursor statute explicitly states that, 
 
       [b]y changing the language [of the provision relating to 
       individualized educational programs] to emphasize the 
       process of parent and child involvement . . . the 
       Committee intends to clarify that such individual 
       planning conferences are a way to provide parent 
       involvement and protection to assure that appropriate 
       services are provided to a handicapped child. 
 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, S. 
Rep. No. 94-168, at 11-12 (1975), reprinted in, 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435. In interpreting the IDEA, the 
Supreme Court has also cautioned that "[t]he primary 
responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded 
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a handicapped child . . . was left by the Act to state and 
local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents 
or guardian of the child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 204, 207 (1982). Courts should avoid imposing their 
views regarding preferred educational methods. Rather, 
"Congress sought to protect individual children by 
providing for parental involvement in the development of 
state plans and policies and in the formulation of the 
child's individual educational program." Id. at 208. 
 
The Act also provides substantial due process protections 
in the form of administrative proceedings and an appeals 
procedure in the event that parents have complaints 
regarding the educational services provided to their 
children. "The parents or guardian shall have an 
opportunity for an impartial due process hearing" before 
the local educational agency, 20 U.S.C. S 1415(b)(2), and for 
an impartial review on appeal to a state educational agency. 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(c). At these hearings all parties, 
specifically parents, are accorded: 
 
       (1) the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel 
       and by individuals with special knowledge or training 
       with respect to the problems of handicapped children, 
 
       (2) the right to present evidence and confront, cross- 
       examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, 
 
       (3) the right to a written or electronic verbatim record 
       of such hearing, and 
 
       (4) the right to written findings of fact . . .. 
 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(d). Thus, during administrative 
proceedings under the IDEA, the Act explicitly envisions 
that parents will act as advocates for their child's right to 
an appropriate education. Congress has also taken steps to 
ensure the effectiveness of parents as advocates during 
administrative proceedings by authorizing the 
establishment of training centers to assist parents in 
understanding their rights and their children's' rights 
under the Act and to help parents to participate effectively 
in administrative due process hearings. 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(e)(2)(B)(I). 
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At the conclusion of all administrative proceedings, the 
Act provides the right to bring a civil action in either federal 
or state court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision" made during the administrative proceedings. 20 
U.S.C. S 1415(e). Although the language of the Act clearly 
delineates an active role for parents during administrative 
proceedings under the IDEA, the Act is silent with regard to 
the nature of the role of parents during federal court 
proceedings under the Act. Thus, it is not clear from the 
language of the Act whether parents are "aggrieved parties" 
able to bring a court action on their own behalf, or whether 
the right to an appeal belongs to their child or belongs to 
both parents and child. 
 
The parents here have asserted their own claim under 
the IDEA which is still pending in the District Court. The 
District Court, however, denied the parents' request that 
the court clarify which of the claims before it were claims 
of the parents. The stated reason for that denial was that 
the parents sought an advisory opinion. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of explicit language in 
the IDEA conclusively determining the role of parents in 
IDEA appeals, the purpose and language of the IDEA 
presuppose the active involvement of parents in enforcing 
the educational rights of their children. Through the IDEA, 
Congress gave to all children with disabilities the 
substantive right to an appropriate education. Children, 
however, whether disabled or not, are not able to evaluate 
the education they are receiving or to request changes in 
the resources and opportunities made available to them. 
The IDEA reflects the practical recognition that parents are 
the persons who are vested with the authority and the 
obligation to oversee their child's education and to enforce 
their child's rights under the Act. The Act also invests 
parents with the procedural rights and protections 
necessary to ensure that they receive access to the 
information and resources necessary to enforce the 
substantive protections and guarantees of the IDEA. 
 
The Act explicitly defines the rights of parents during 
administrative proceedings. See 20 U.S.C.S 1415. Although 
the Act does not contain the same explicit definition of the 
rights of parents during appeals brought in federal court, 
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there is evidence that Congress did not intend parental 
involvement under the IDEA to be confined to the 
administrative process. Nor does it make sense, in the 
absence of clear Congressional intent, to deny parents, who 
are parties with full procedural protections during 
administrative proceedings under the Act, the right to 
challenge the outcome of these proceedings. 
 
Evidence of congressional intent regarding the role of 
parents during federal court proceedings under the IDEA 
may be gleaned from the amendment of the Act to include 
a fee-shifting provision, authorizing the award of attorneys' 
fees to plaintiffs who prevail in appeals from administrative 
proceedings. Under the Act, attorneys' fees will be awarded 
"to the parents or guardian of a child or youth with a 
disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(e)(4)(B). Attorneys' fees will not be awarded if the 
parents reject a settlement agreement offering more 
favorable relief than is ultimately obtained in the judicial 
proceedings. 20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(4)(D)(iii). In contrast, "an 
award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to 
a parent or guardian who is the prevailing party and who 
was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer." 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(4)(E) (emphasis added). 
 
The legislative history of the fee-shifting provisions states 
that, "Congress' original intent was that due process 
procedures, including the right to litigation if that became 
necessary be available to all parents." Handicapped 
Children's Protection Act of 1986, S. Rep. 99-112, at 2, 
reprinted at, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799. The Senate 
Committee Report explicitly states that the fee-shifting 
provision should not limit the payment of attorneys' fees to 
nonprofit, publicly-funded organizations who provide legal 
assistance to parents. Rather, the Committee members 
endorsed the principle that "the parents or legal 
representative of handicapped children must be able to 
access the full range of available remedies in order to 
protect their handicapped children's educational rights." Id. 
at 17, reprinted at, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1806. In this case, 
the Collinsgrus argue that the fee-shifting provisions are 
insufficient to protect their interests under the Act. They 
have not been able to find any attorney to represent them 
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in the IDEA action. Their only remaining avenue to protect 
their son's educational rights under the Act is to proceed 
pro se with their challenge to the administrative denial of 
special education benefits. 
 
The right of children to receive an appropriate education 
may well be meaningless without parents to guide the 
evaluation of their needs and to monitor the 
implementation of their individualized education program. 
The procedural safeguards afforded to parents under the 
IDEA, including the right to receive attorneys' fees, codify 
the role of parents as the guardians of their children's 
education. In light of the special relationship between 
parents and their children and the special role of parents in 
enforcing their children's rights under the IDEA, the right 
of parents to control the education of their child and the 
right of children to receive an appropriate education are 
highly interwoven and interdependent. Accordingly, I 
conclude that parents who wish to challenge the outcome 
of administrative proceedings under the IDEA are aggrieved 
parties with the right to bring an appeal under the Act. 
Thus, the rights created by the IDEA are effectively shared 
by children and their parents. As parties to IDEA 
proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1654, parents should 
be able to proceed pro se in IDEA appeals brought in 
federal court to enforce their own rights and those of their 
children. 
 
Moreover, the rights at stake in an IDEA proceeding are 
markedly different from those raised by a tort claim. A 
child's common law claim for damages does not invoke the 
fundamental rights and interests of a parent in the same 
manner as a claim for educational benefits under the IDEA. 
Indeed, many of the benefits of an appropriate education 
will be lost if they are not timely pursued. Cf. Osei-Afriyie, 
937 F.2d at 882 (noting that under Pennsylvania law, the 
civil claims of minors are tolled until they reach the age of 
18). Because parents bear the ultimate responsibility for 
guaranteeing their child's right to an education, they 
should be afforded all available opportunities to enforce and 
protect that right. 
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I would therefore recognize the right of parents to proceed 
pro se in an IDEA case on their child's behalf, as well as on 
their own behalf. 
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